The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton by Michael G. MacKinnon

Author:Michael G. MacKinnon [MacKinnon, Michael G.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, General, Political Science
ISBN: 9781135260613
Google: GQ3aAAAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2013-09-13T15:57:33+00:00

The Bureaucracies

Critics of PDD 25, if they realize public opinion is not to blame, might be tempted to blame the bureaucrats who crafted the document for the remarkable policy reversal contained therein. After all, the review was left in their hands for over 14 months and the only source of information on the evolving policy was through leaks to the press because the whole drafting process was conducted behind closed doors. Known for their tendency to engage in so-called ‘turf wars’ over what must appear to the outsider as seemingly mundane or trivial issues, the bureaucracies certainly did pose easy targets, in the days following the Directive’s public release, to those who questioned the wisdom of the new policy, especially in the shadow of the misery that was Rwanda in the spring of 1994. Furthermore, many writers have identified prominent personalities among the bureaucrats as leading characters in the PDD 25 story, including the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell. While not denying that the principal departments had their differences and their own agendas, this section will argue against this sort of analysis because first, it overlooks the key agreements achieved which might have cleared the way for a more positive final policy; second, it overstates those differences; and third, it unfairly casts General Powell as the spoiler, or in the view of others, the hero of the whole process.

With regard to the overlooked agreements, it is evident from the discussion in Chapter 3, that the State Department and Pentagon were able to dispense with most of their disagreements in short order, save one, or rather, two connected thorns. These two particular issues divided the State Department and Pentagon staffs very sharply, and were cited as the primary reasons for the delay in the signing of the policy during early 1994. The metaphorical thorns which caused such controversy were the inter-related issues of budget and responsibility. Unlike other differences between the departments over command issues or the earmarking of units for UN service, the funding and responsibility issues reportedly took many months to settle.4 At the heart of the dispute was a long history of the State Department’s self-serving accounting practices, and the increased control over peacekeeping policy that accompanies any increases of budgetary resources. As a compromise, the departments were given the lead roles in different types of peace operations under a plan called ‘Shared Responsibility’. Under this plan, State was primarily responsible for financing America’s contribution to Chapter VI missions in which no US combat units are deployed; while the Pentagon was handed financial and organizing responsibility for Chapter VII missions, or Chapter VI missions in which US combat troops were participating.5 Unfortunately, what might have been a coup for the NSC in bringing the two departments together and finally resolving a long-standing bone of contention proved to be a moot victory for cooperation and compromise; Congress killed the deal.

These skirmishes, however, were disagreements over details of how to implement the wider policy of ‘assertive multilateralism’, and then later to satisfy the concerns of Congress.

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